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Comments I
Is Local Government the Equivalent of
State Government for Purposes of the
Market Participant Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause?
I. Introduction
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution
grants Congress the power to regulate interstate commerce.' The
Supreme Court has interpreted the Commerce Clause to have a
negative or dormant aspect.2 The Dormant Commerce Clause is a
judicial doctrine standing for the proposition that the existence of
the Constitution's federal commerce power restricts the states from
3burdening interstate commerce.
The Dormant Commerce Clause restricts state activity even in
the absence of congressional regulation in a given area.4 State
1. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 ("Congress shall have power ... to regulate
Commerce ... among the several States.").
2. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc. v. Dep't. of Envtl. Quality, 511 U.S. 93, 98
(1994); see also New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273 (1988)
("It has long been accepted that the Commerce Clause not only grants Congress
the authority to regulate commerce among the States, but also directly limits the
power of the States to discriminate against interstate commerce.").
3. See Oregon Waste Sys., Inc., 511 U.S. at 98.
4. See Southern Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 769 (1995).
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regulations that discriminate against interstate commerce by
favoring in-state interests over out of-state competitors "are
routinely struck down, 'unless the discrimination [they impose] is
demonstrably justified by a valid factor unrelated to economic
protectionism."' 5  However, if the state is acting as a market
participant then the state action, even if imposing a burden on
interstate commerce, is valid under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.6
The subject of this comment is the application of the market
participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause when state
government is directing the proprietary activities of local
government. Section II will provide a brief historical background
of the Dormant Commerce Clause. Section III will discuss both the
modern Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce Clause jurisprud-
ence as well as the Court's purpose in creating the market
participant exception. Section IV will discuss and analyze the
differing market participant approaches applied by the Federal
Courts of Appeals to situations where the state is directing the
proprietary actions of local government.7 This section will focus on
the Seventh Circuit's decision in W.C.M. Window Company,
Incorporated v Bernardi,8 and how the Eighth Circuit, in National
Solid Waste Management Association v. Williams,9 declined to
follow the reasoning of the W. C.M. Window court, instead adopting
the approach favored by the Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuits.°
Section V will discuss which circuit's approach is best
supported in light of Supreme Court precedent in areas involving
5. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1177 (9th Cir.
1992).
6. See Reeves, Inc. v Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 437 (1990).
7. Compare W. C.M. Window Co., Inc.,. v. Bernardi, 730 F.2d 486, 494 (7th
Cir. 1984) with National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n. v. Williams, 146 F.3d 595,597
(8th Cir. 1998), and Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc. v. South Carolina Procurement
Review Panel, 20 F.3d 1311, 1319-20 (4th Cir. 1994), and Big Country Foods, Inc. v.
Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173, 1179 (9th Cir. 1992), and Trojan Tech., Inc. v.
Pennsylvania, 916 F.2d 903, 911 (3d Cir. 1990). The Seventh Circuit characterizes
the state as a regulator when the state directs the purchasing of local government
entities when the purchasing is done for a non-state funded or administered
project. See W. C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F2d at 494. The Third, Fourth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits favor an approach that views local government as a subpart of
the state. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597; Smith Setzer &
Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319-20; Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan
Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911 Thus the state is not acting as a regulator, but as a
purchaser when it directs the proprietary actions of local government. See id.
8. 730 F.2d 486 (7th Cir. 1984).
9. 146 F.3d 595 (8th Cir. 1998).
10. See id. at 599.
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the relationship between state and local government, the Dormant
Commerce Clause and the market participant exception.
II. A Negative Commerce Power?
The United States Supreme Court has historically used the
Commerce Clause as a means to eliminate interstate trade
disputes." The Court has stated that one of the great improvements
of the U.S. Constitution was eliminating these disputes "[which]
had plagued the relations among the colonies and later among the
states under the Articles of Confederation.""'
The Supreme Court first discussed the existence of the
dormant aspect of the Commerce Clause in Gibbons v. Ogden,3 in
which the court stated that the Commerce Clause can limit the
states' ability to regulate in a given area even in the absence of a
preemptive exercise of the federal commerce power."
The Dormant Commerce Clause has been traditionally used by
the United States Supreme Court to respond to state taxes and
regulatory measures that impede interstate commerce. 5  "This
nation is a common market in which state laws cannot be made
barriers to the free flow of both raw materials and finished goods in
11. See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 325 (1979).
12. Id.; see also Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 807 (1976)
(Alexandria Scrap states: "The [Commerce] Clause was designed in part to prevent
trade barriers that had undermined efforts of the fledging states to form a cohesive
whole following their victory in the revolution.").
13. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).
14. Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 17-18. Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Gibbons
describes the relationship between the states and the federal government in the
absence of congressional action in an area effecting interstate commerce:
This doctrine of a general concurrent power in the States, is insidious and
dangerous. If it be admitted, no one can say where it will stop. The
States may legislate, it is said, wherever Congress has not made a plenary
exercise of its power. But who is to judge whether Congress has made
this plenary exercise of power? Congress has acted on this power; it has
done all that it deemed wise; and are the States now to do whatever
Congress has left undone? Congress makes such rules as, in its judgment,
the case requires; and those rules whatever they are constitute the system.
All useful regulation does not consist in restraint; and that which
Congress sees fit to leave free, is a part of its regulation, as much as the
rest.
See id. at 17-18. See also Cooley v. Board of Wardens of the Port of Philadelphia,
53 U.S. 299, 305 (1851) (stating with regards to the recognition of a negative
commerce power in Gibbons: "The decision in Gibbons v. Ogden has never been
in the least degree questioned or shaken.. .Any other rule would be fatal to the
peace of the country.").
15. See Reeves. Inc.. 447 U.S. at 437.
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response to the economic laws of supply and demand."'6 Those
Supreme Court decisions in which the Dormant Commerce Clause
is used to declare a state law unconstitutional usually deal with state
activity that interferes with the national market through regulations
or prohibitions.7
III. The United States Supreme Court's Modern Dormant
Commerce Clause Approach.
The modern Supreme Court's Dormant Commerce Clause
approach was illustrated in Pike v. Bruce Church, Incorporated.
8
Pike dealt with an Arizona packaging requirement imposed on
intrastate fruit growers. 9
The court laid out a three-part analysis to determine whether a
state regulation is constitutional under the Dormant Commerce
Clause." First, the statute or regulation must meet a legitimate
state interest.2' Second, the regulation must be related to the
legitimate interest.22 Third, the regulatory burden imposed by the
state on interstate commerce must be outweighed by the legitimate
state interest.
23
Whether a state regulation violates the Dormant Commerce
Clause also depends on whether the state is acting as a regulator or
as a market participant.24 The first United States Supreme Court
case to articulate the market participant exception was Hughes v.
16. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 803.
17. See id. at 806 ("The common thread of all these cases is that the state
interfered with the natural functioning of the interstate market either through
prohibitions or through burdensome regulations.").
18. 397 U.S. 137 (1970).
19. See id. at 138.
20. See id. The court described the necessary analysis of state regulation
under the Dormant Commerce Clause as follows:
Although the criteria for determining the validity of state statutes
affecting interstate commerce have been variously stated, the general rule
that emerges can be phrased as follows: Where the statute regulates even-
handedly to effectuate a legitimate local public interest, and its effects on
interstate commerce are only incidental, it will be upheld unless the
burden imposed on such commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the
putative local benefits. If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the
question becomes one of degree. And the extent of the burden that will
be tolerated will of course be dependant on the nature of the local
interest involved, and on whether it could be promoted as well with a
lesser impact on interstate activities. (citations omitted)
See id.
21. See id.
22- See Pike, 397 U.S. at 138.
23. See id.
24. See Reeves, Inc. 447 U.S. at 436-37.
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Alexandria Scrap Corporation. In Alexandria Scrap the court held
that if the state is acting as a market participant, then state activity
that burdens interstate commerce is not in violation of the Dormant
Commerce Clause.26  "Nothing in the purpose animating the
Commerce Clause prohibits a State, in the absence of congressional
action, from participating in the market and exercising the right to
favor its own citizens over others." 27
The application of the market participant exception does not
mean that the challenged state activity presents no burden on
interstate commerce.2 Rather, the exception applies when the state
is acting as a participant in the market rather than as a regulator
and therefore any effect on interstate commerce represents a
permissible burden by the challenged state activity.29 Thus, if the
threshold inquiry as to whether the state is a regulator or a market
participant leads to the conclusion that the state is merely entering
the market, no independent justification for such market action by
the state is required under Dormant Commerce Clause Analysis.'
The state's character when it enters the market serves as
justification for the market participant exception.3' When a state
buys or sells, the state has characteristics of both "a political entity
and a private person," and like a private person the state in this
guise has unlimited power to determine with whom it will deal.32
The Court has further justified the market participant
exception due to concerns for state sovereignty and the state's role
as trustee for its citizens.3 Thus, the market participant exception
25. See Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. at 808. The court introduced the
market participant exception by stating:
Until today the court has not been asked to hold that the entry of the
state itself into the market as a purchaser, in effect, of a potential article
of interstate commerce creates a burden upon that commerce if the state
restricts its trade to its own citizens or businesses within the state... We
do not believe the Commerce Clause was intended to require
independent justification for such action.
See id.
26. See id. at 810.
27. Id.; see also Independent Charities of Am., Inc. v. Minnesota, 82 F.3d 791,
795 (8th Cir. 1996) (The Eighth Circuit, in Independent Charities of Am., Inc.,
explained the reason for the market participant exception: "[T]here is no
indication that the [Commerce] Clause was intended to limit the ability of the
states themselves to operate in the free market.").
28. See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 436.
29. See id. at 435.
30. See id. at 436; W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 494.
31. Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439.
32. See id. at 437 (holding that state proprietary functions are exempt from
Commerce Clause scrutiny).
33. See id. at 438 ("Restraint in this area is also counseled by considerations of
2000]
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allows the state to engage in proprietary activities" for the benefit
of its residents without concern for the restrictions created by the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 5 Additionally, activities and consider-
ations involving state proprietary action "will often be subtle,
complex, politically charged and difficult to assess under traditional
Commerce Clause analysis." 36 Therefore, another justification for
the market participant exception is ease of application when courts
analyze the burden imposed by state proprietary activity on the
national market.37
IV. The Application of the Market Participant Exception to Cases
Involving a State Directing the Proprietary Activities of Local
Government
A. The State as Regulator or the State as Market Participant?
The purpose behind the Dormant Commerce Clause is to
prevent "economic protectionism," meaning state regulatory action
that discriminates in favor of in-state businesses over out-of-state
competitors.3 However, if a state is acting as a market participant,
rather than as a market regulator, the Dormant Commerce Clause
places no restriction on state activities.39 "Put roughly, the market
participant doctrine protects states when they are acting as parties
to a commercial transaction rather than.. .when they are acting as
market regulators."'
Whether the market participant exception applies when state
government directs the proprietary activities of local government
depends on the characterization of the state's actions toward the
local government entity. If the state is viewed as regulating the
activities of the local government entity, and the local government
is viewed to be a participant in the market independent from the
state, then the market participant exception should not apply. State
state sovereignty, the role of each state as 'guardian and trustee for its people."')
(citing Heim v. McCall, 239 U.S. 178, 191 (1915)).
34. The Supreme Court has described those state actions which fall under the
market participant exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause as "proprietary
functions," meaning purchasing, selling, hiring or subsidizing activities. See Reeves,
437 U.S. at 437.
35. See id.
36. Id. at 439.
37. See id.
38. See New Energy Co. of Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 274 (1988).
39. See South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunicke, 467 U.S. 82, 93 (1984).
40. Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 437.
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regulatory activity should then be analyzed under traditional
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, as described in Pike."
Viewing the state as a regulator when it directs the proprietary
action of intrastate local government entities is the approach taken
by the Seventh Circuit.42
However, if local government is seen by the courts as merely
an extension of the state government, deriving its existence and
authority from the state, then the state government's directing the
proprietary actions of local government would merely be the state
acting as a participant in the market through the local agencies
which it has created and over which it has ultimate control. If state
and local government are one in the same for purposes of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, then the market participant exception
should apply when the state directs the proprietary actions of local
government. This is the approach taken by the Third, Fourth,
Eighth and Ninth Circuits.43 The Supreme Court has not chosen to
resolve the issue.44
B. The Seventh Circuit's Approach: The State as Regulator
In W.C.M. Window, the Seventh Circuit stated that the market
participant exception should not apply when a state is directing the
proprietary activities of local government.4 '5 The court found that in
such cases, the market participant is actually the local government
entity, and the state is acting as a regulator.44
W.C.M. Window addressed the constitutionality of an Illinois
statute giving preference to Illinois laborers.4 ' The act stated that
any contractor working on a public works project for the state must
hire Illinois' laborers unless Illinois' laborers are either unavailable
or incapable of performing the necessary type of work.'
41. See Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
42. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
43. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597; Smith Setzer &
Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319-20; Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan
Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
44. See National Solid Waste Mgmt Ass'n v. Williams, 525 U.S. 1012 (1998)
(writ of certiorari denied); Trojan Tech., Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 501 U.S. 1212 (1990)
(writ of certiorari denied).
45. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
46. See id.
47. See id. at 489.
48. See id. at 495. The court described the challenged statute as follows:
The Act provides that the contractor on 'any public works project... for
the state of Illinois or any political subdivision, municipal corporation or
other governmental unit thereof shall employ only Illinois laborers on
such project or improvement,' unless.. .Illinois laborers either 'are not
2000]
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W.C.M. Window, an Illinois corporation, was hired to replace
windows by an Illinois' school board.49 W.C.M. Window sub-
contracted the work out to an association of Missouri residents."
Bernardi, the director of the Illinois Department of Labor, filed suit
in state court seeking to enjoin W.C.M. Window from violating the
preference law.5 W.C.M. Window filed suit against Bernardi in the
district court seeking a temporary restraining order to prevent
52Bernardi from proceeding with the state court action.
The federal district court found that the preference law
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause. 3 Bernardi appealed the
district court's decision to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit.' The Court of Appeals found that the preference
law was in effect a tariff, which unconstitutionally burdened
interstate commerce. 5
The court stated that if Illinois had limited the preference law
to construction projects that were administered or financed to some
degree by the state, then the law would not have violated the
Dormant Commerce Clause. 6 The court reasoned that a limited
preference law would have fallen under the market participant
exception, as the state would have been acting as a participant, due
to its administrative or financial role in the projects.57
However, the preference law applied to every public
construction project in the state, regardless of the state's role in the
project. The court found that the window-replacement project at
issue in the case was neither administered nor financed by the state,
and that the market participant was the school board that wanted
the windows replaced, not the state of Illinois 9 The court stressed
that for purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis, every
local government unit will not be considered as part of the state
government, given that all state governments are decentralized and
that local government agencies often have substantial autonomy.
6
0
available, or are incapable of performing the type of work involved.'
See id.
49. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 489.
50. See id.
51. See id. at 490.
52. See id. at 489-90.
53. See id at 495.





59. See W.C.M. Window Co., 730 F.2d at 495.
60. See id.
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The Seventh Circuit found that in passing the law the state of
Illinois was in fact regulating the conduct of independent local
entities."
C. The Approach Adopted By the Eighth Circuit: Following the
Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits in Declaring the State and
Local Government a Unified Market Participant
Those Federal Courts of Appeals who have also decided cases
in which the state directs the proprietary functions of local
government have declined to follow the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit.62 In National Solid Waste Management Association, the
Eighth Circuit held that the market participant exception applies
when the state is regulating the conduct of local government.63 This
is the most recent decision in a line of Federal Court of Appeals
cases taking a similar position.'
The Eighth Circuit found that when the state is directing local
government purchases, the local government is equivalent to the
state for purposes of determining whether the state is acting as a
651market participant. In National Solid Waste Management
Association, the court upheld the constitutionality of Minnesota's
Waste Management Act.6 This act required counties to implement
comprehensive waste management plans, and required public
entities to manage their waste in accordance with their respective
county's plan.67
The National Solid Waste Management Association
("Association") was a group of Minnesota waste disposal
businesses. The Association filed suit against the state alleging that
the act violated the Commerce Clause because the state was
regulating the purchasing of local entities who were market
participants independent from the state.' The district court granted
61. See id. ("The state is a regulator, telling thousands of local government
units that they must not give construction contracts to employers of
nonresidents.").
62- See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597; Smith Setzer &
Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319; Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan Tech.,
Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
63. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 146 F.3d at 599.
64. See id at 597. The Third, Fourth, and Ninth Circuits agree with this ruling.
See Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319; Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at
1179; Trojan Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
65. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 146 F.3d at 597.
66. See MINN. STAT. §§ 115a.46, 473.803 (West 1997).
67. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597.
68. See id. at 599.
2000]
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summary judgement for the state. As a result, the Association
appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit.
The Eighth Circuit found that the state of Minnesota was
acting as a market participant in directing the purchasing of local
government. 9 The court reasoned that all local government entities
are created by the state and their authority derives from the state.70
The court found that local government entities, which are clearly
subject to the power of the state, are not acting independent of the
state when they contract for the removal of their waste. 71  The
Eighth Circuit determined that in this situation the state is merely
acting as a market participant and is therefore free to choose the
parties with whom it does business with as if it were a private
entity.
The Third, Fourth and Ninth Circuits have in the past adopted
an approach that is in agreement with that of the Eight Circuit's
recent holding in National Solid Waste Management Association.
The Ninth Circuit, in Big Country Foods, Incorporated v. Board of
Education,73 addressed the constitutionality of an Alaskan statute
giving seven percent bidding preference to Alaskan milk producers
who sold milk to Alaskan school districts.74
The Ninth Circuit found that the Alaskan preference statute
was not in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause because "[a]
state should not be penalized for exercising its power through
smaller, localized units; local control fosters both administrative
efficiency and democratic governance., 75  The court found that
political subdivisions exist at the will of the state, and therefore
local government agencies should be considered as part of the state
government for purposes of Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. 6
The Ninth Circuit's approach, that courts should be reluctant
to make case specific inquiries into whether local government units
are acting independent from state, is a practical analysis. 7 This
approach, unlike that of the W.C.M. Window court,8 does not
69. See id. at 599.
70. See id.
71. See id. at 599-600.
72. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n, 146 F.3d at 599.
73. Big Country Foods, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 952 F.2d 1173 (9th Cir. 1992).
74. See id. at 1175.
75. Id at 1179.
76. See id. ("A rule that would consider all political subdivisions as separate
from state control for market participant purposes would be anomalous to the
proposition that political subdivisions exist at the will of the state.").
77. See id.
78. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
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require courts to make case-by-case inquiries into the degree of
autonomy held by a local government entity and how that level of
autonomy impacts the relationship with the state government when
the state is directing the purchasing of the local government.
79
In Trojan Technologies, Incorporated v. Pennsylvania'°, the
Third Circuit also found that the market participant exception
applied when state government directs the purchasing of local
government.8 The case dealt with a Pennsylvania statute requiring
suppliers who contract with a state agency to use American made
steel in their products. '
In analyzing the validity of the Pennsylvania preference law,
the Third Circuit declined to follow the reasoning of the Seventh
Circuit.83 The court stated: "[wie find no compelling analytical
difference between a local government unit and central state
agencies. Both exist only through affirmative acts of the state. A
municipality derives its authority from the state. '
The Third Circuit found that under Pennsylvania law, local
government entities are created by and subject to the control of the
state. 85 The court reasoned that if a state can impose restrictions on
the contracting authority of central state agencies and fall under the
market participant exception, then the state should be able to
impose those same restrictions on local agencies, whose authority,
like central agencies, derives from the state.86
The Fourth Circuit has reached the same conclusion as the
Third, Eighth and Ninth Circuits in Smith Setzer & Sons,
Incorporated v. South Carolina Procurement Review Panel,7 stating:
"..[w]e do not believe that [W.C.M. Window] reflects the better
view regarding the parameters of the market regulator/market
participant distinction under the negative Commerce Clause. ''
The case dealt with a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a
South Carolina statute which gave preferences in the bidding
79. See Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179 (the court stated that
considering some political subdivisions separate from the state "would lead to
difficult case-specific inquiries into the degree of the subdivisions autonomy").
80. 916 F.2d 903 (3rd Cir. 1990).
81. See id. at 910.
82 See id. at 904
83. See id. at 911.
84. Id.
85. See Trojan Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 904 ("Under Pennsylvania law it is clear
that the local bodies covered by the statute exist only by the grace of state
authority and with such powers as the state affirmatively provides.").
86. See id at 911.




process for state projects to state vendors, as well as domestic
vendors generally." The court upheld the statute because the state
was acting as a market participant.90
The Fourth Circuit found that under Dormant Commerce
Clause analysis, state and local governments should not be treated
differently for purposes of applying the market participant
exception.91 The court found that the correct inquiry was to
determine when the state stops regulating its own market activities
(including the activities of local government), as opposed to when
the state begins regulating the activities of non-state interests, in
which case the market participant exception no longer applies.'
The Fourth Circuit reasoned as follows:
[W]e cannot discern a valid distinction to explain why state
regulations that bind local governmental units should not be
considered equally as innocuous, constitutionally speaking, as
state regulations that bind statewide governmental units.
Rather than focus on the state's action to see whether it is
'regulatory," or on the quantitative impact of the regulation
involved, the proper inquiry is onto whom the state regulates: so
long as the regulated party is a public entity, we do not believe
the market participant doctrine's bounds are exceeded. 93
V. Which Approach Favored By the Various Federal Courts of
Appeals Is Supported By Supreme Court Precedent?
The threshold question under market participant analysis when
state government directs the proprietary actions of local govern-
ment is whether the local government is considered by the courts as
a proprietary entity separate from the state government or whether
89. See id. at 1314.
90. See id. at 1319-20.
91. See id. The court stated:
There is little analytic reason to treat the two separately for Commerce
Clause purposes; market participation by either is immunized from
negative Commerce Clause attack. State rules that "regulate" the market
actions of a state's constituent agencies, departments and other state-
level organizational manifestations are conceded not to be considered
"market regulating" for negative Commerce Clause purposes. To posit
then that the state is "regulating" the market in requiring local
government to abide by its rules thus sidesteps the actual inquiry here,
which is to determine at what point the state stops regulating itself and its
action in the market qua market participant (a type of action immune
from attack) and begins regulating non-state actors (a type of action
subject to attack). See id.
92. See Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319-20.
93. Id. at 1320.
[Vol. 104:4
THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
local government is viewed as merely a subdivision of the state.
This characterization is critical because a primary function of the
"market participant exception" is to allow a state to regulate itself
(meaning state agencies) in a manner that impacts a state's
proprietary activities without running afoul of the Dormant
Commerce Clause. '
State government provides local government entities with
authority, thus allowing local government to act as an agent of the
state in addressing the needs of the state's citizenry. 9  If the
purpose of the market participant exception is to allow states to act
in the market, even if such activity encumbers interstate
commerce,9 then the market participant exception would be most
effective if it applied when the state is regulating local government.
Local governments perform a tremendous amount of
purchasing, selling and hiring, which is a direct result of state
government granting local government proprietary autonomy in the
name of administrative efficiency.'
The decisions in this area of the Third, Fourth, Eighth and
Ninth circuits differ in a fundamental nature from that of the
Seventh Circuit. Those courts, unlike the Seventh Circuit, did not
look to which entity (the state or local government) was in fact
doing the purchasing, looking instead to whether the local entity
was merely an extension of the state.9 The most recent of this line
of cases, National Solid Waste Management Association, articulated
this characterization as follows:
In this case, the state is performing as a market participant in
directing the behavior of local government units. Under
Minnesota state law, the legislature has unlimited authority over
local government units. All of the public entities covered by
[the regulation in question] derive their power solely from the
state. We are hard pressed to fathom how an entity created by
the state, controlled by the state, and subject to the absolute
power of the state, should be considered an independent entity
94. See id. at 1319 (The court stated: "State rules that 'regulate' the market
actions of a state's constituent agencies, departments, and other state-level
organizational manifestations are conceded not to be considered 'market
regulating' for negative Commerce Clause purposes.").
95. See Trojan Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911 n.15.
96. See Independent Charities of Am., Inc., 82 F.3d at 795.
97. See Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179.
98. Compare National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597, and Smith
Setzer & Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319-20, and Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at




when it undertakes to buy waste services on the open
market.(citations omitted) 99
Thus, under the analysis adopted by the Third, Fourth, Eighth
and Ninth Circuits, who was in fact making the purchases is
irrelevant as to who is actually the market participant." °
A. The United States Supreme Court's Application of the Market
Participant Exception to Local Governmeny
The Supreme Court has, in decisions dealing with the
relationship between state government and local government
entities, held that local government units are merely an extension of
the state.'' The Court has stated that "however great or small its
sphere of action, it [the local government entity] remains the
creature of the state exercising and holding powers and privileges
subject to the sovereign will."'"'1
Yet, the Unites States Supreme Court does not treat local
government as being equivalent to state government for all
constitutional inquiries. For example, Eleventh Amendment
immunity does not bar suit against municipalities. 13 However, in
White v. Massachusetts Council of Construction Employers,
Incorporated, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that the proprietary
actions of local government fall within the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause. 4
White dealt with the constitutionality of an executive order
issued by the mayor of Boston which required that all construction
projects funded all or in part by the city had to be performed by a
work force consisting of at least fifty-percent bona fide residents of
Boston. °  The United States Supreme Court held that the
99. National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., Inc., 146 F.3d at 599-600.
100. See id. at 599; Smith Setzer & Sons, Inc, 20 F.3d at 1319; Big Country
Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
101. United Building & Constr. Trade Council of Camden County and Vicinity
v. Mayor and Council of the City of Camden, 465 U.S. 208, 215 (1984) ("a
municipality is merely a political subdivision of the state from which its authority
derives").
102. Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 187 (1923).
103. See Lincoln County v. Luning, 153 U.S. 529, 530 (1890) ("[T]he Eleventh
Amendment, which restrains the jurisdiction granted by the Constitution over suits
against State, is of necessity limited to those suits in which the State is a party of
record.").
104. See White, 460 U.S. at 204.
105. See id. at 205.
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executive order was constitutional under the market participant
exception."
The court found that the singular inquiry as to the applicability
of the market participant exception is whether the constitutionally
challenged action "constituted direct participation in the market"
by the state or local government entity.1°7 The court found that
those hired to work on city funded projects were, in essence,
employees of the city of Boston.'0 Therefore, the city was acting as
a market participant by choosing whom it would hire."
Under the holding of White, the proprietary activities of local
government entities are eligible to fall within the market participant
exception to the Dormant Commerce Clause. ° However, White
dealt with a local government generating a restriction on its own
proprietary activity. 1' The case did not deal with a situation where
the state was directing the purchasing of a local government entity,
as was the case in W.C.M. Window and National Soild Waste
Management Association. 112
The Seventh Circuit, in WC.M. Window, distinguished the
situation at issue in that case from the Supreme Court's holding in
White."3 The Seventh Circuit found that the Illinois preference law
was not limited to projects funded or administered in full or even in
part by the state of Illinois."' The Seventh Circuit therefore found
that the validity of the Illinois preference law was not dictated by
the holding of White, as the order in question in White only dealt
with projects funded by the city of Boston."5
106. See id. at 208 ("when a state or local government enters the market as a
participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.").
107. Id.
108. See id. at 211 n.7.
109. See White, 460 U.S. at 211 n.7.
110. See id. at 208 ("when a state or local government enters the market as a
participant it is not subject to the restraints of the Commerce Clause.").
111. See id. at 205-206 (the mayor of Boston issued the executive order
requiring the hiring of Boston residents).
112. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 493; National Solid Waste Mgmt.
Ass'n, 146 F.3d at 597-98.
113. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
114. See id.
115. Compare id., with White, 460 U.S. at 205. The Seventh Circuit
distinguished the situation in W.C.M. Window, Inc. from that in White as follows:
.. if the State of Illinois had limited the preference law to construction
projects financed (in whole or in part) or administered by state, it would
be clear after White that the law did not violate the commerce clause.
But the state has gone further. The preference law applies to every
public construction contract in Illinois, even if the purchaser is a local
school board, or for that matter the local dogcatcher.
See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
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The Seventh Circuit held that due to the lack of state financial
or administrative involvement in the projects covered by the Illinois
preference law, the market participant exception did not apply.116
The court found that the state was in fact acting as a regulator,
"telling thousands of local government units that they must not give
construction contracts to employers of nonresidents....7
However, under Supreme Court precedent, the correct inquiry
to determine whether local government proprietary action taken in
response to state regulation can fall within the market participant
exception is to determine whether the local government agency is
ultimately independent from the state.
118
B. State Government and Local Government as a Unified Market
Participant
White stands for the proposition that local government
proprietary action is included in the market participant exception. 9
When this holding is analyzed in light of Supreme Court rulings
that local government entities are creatures of the state, deriving
their power and authority from the state,12 it seems clear that the
analysis of the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits has greater
justification in Supreme Court precedent than does that of the
Seventh Circuit's decision in W.C.M. Window.
State law provides further insight into the relationship between
local and state government. In Minnesota, the state dealt with in
National Solid Waste Management Association, courts have held as
a matter of state law that the state legislature has complete
116. See WC.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
117. Id. The Seventh Circuit then went on to determine that the regulation was
unconstitutional under the Dormant Commerce Clause as the state was unable to
provide a legitimate local interest to justify the regulation. See id. at 496.
118. See White, 460 U.S. at 208. The White court stated that whether the
activities of state or local government fall within the market participant exception
depends upon "a single inquiry: whether the challenged program constituted direct
state participation in the market." Id. Therefore, if state and local government are
seen as one in the same when the state directs the proprietary activities of local
government, the exception should apply. See id. The Seventh Circuit suggests that
which entity is in fact making or paying for the purchases in question should
determine the applicability of the exception. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730
F.2d at 495. This analysis seems flawed in light of White because if the local
government is viewed as part of the state, then the state is directing its own
proprietary activities in regulating the purchasing, selling or hiring of local
government. See White, 460 U.S. at 208.
119. See White, 460 U.S. at 208.
120. See United Building, 465 U.S. at 215; Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. at
187.
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authority over local government entities. 12' In Pennsylvania, the
courts have stated: "[a] county is merely a subdivision of the State
Government. It is neither a sovereign nor an independent entity.'
122
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that the state has
absolute control over local government entities, and that the state
has the ability to add or subtract from the local entities' authority.'
3
The Pennsylvania court's analysis of the relationship between the
state and local government was applied by the Third Circuit in
Trojan Technologies.""
In W.C.M. Window, the Seventh Circuit noted that for many
purposes, including Due Process and Equal Protection analysis,
every local government entity in Illinois is part of the central state
government.12 5 The court, however, declined to apply this general
rule to cases dealing with Dormant Commerce Clause challenges.'26
The court instead chose to pronounce a rule requiring case by case
inquiries into the degree of autonomy held by the local government
unit to determine whether it should be consider as part of the state
121government.
The problematic nature of the Seventh Circuit's approach is
illustrated by the Supreme Court's statement in Reeves that one of
the central reasons for the existence of the market participant
exception is the inherent difficulty in analyzing the nature of state
proprietary functions.'2" Therefore, a case by case analysis as to
which entity, the state or the local government, is actually the
market participant and to what extent the local entity is
autonomous from the state is contrary to the very reason the
121. See Erickson v. Gram, 210 N.W. 616, 616 (1926) ("The power of the
legislature over municipal corporations is unlimited, save as to constitutional
restrictions.").
122. Department of Public Welfare v. Adams County, 373 A.2d 143, 145 n.4 (Pa.
Commw. Ct. 1977).
123. See Pennsylvania Turnpike Commission Land Condemnation Case, 32
A.2d 910, 913 (1943) ("The Commonwealth has absolute control over such
agencies with power to add to or subtract from the duties to be performed by them
or to abolish them.").
124. See Trojan Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
125. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc., 730 F.2d at 495.
126. See id.
127. See id.
128. See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438 (the court stated that the market
participant exception's inherent deference to the state is justified because activities
and considerations involving state proprietary functions "will often be subtle,




exception was created by the Supreme Court, that being ease of
application."9
And while the Supreme Court has determined that state and
local government are not to be treated as one in the same for
purposes of Eleventh Amendment immunity, this is because the
immunity conferred protects the state in its sovereign capacity.'
3°
However, the market participant exception, unlike the Eleventh
Amendment, actually seizes on the "private" characteristics of state
and local government when they act as parties to a commercial
transaction.'31 The market participant exception recognizes that
state and local government often conduct business in the market as
if they were private actors.
The "private" proprietary independence that local government
enjoys from state government is a result of the intentional
delegation of authority by the state.133 If a purpose of the market
participant exception is to allow the state to fulfill its obligation as
trustee for its citizens by engaging in proprietary activities as if it
were a private actor,"M it seems unfounded that the exception would
not apply because a state chooses to fulfill its obligations through
more efficient localized means.
Finally, the Seventh Circuit's approach ignores another
primary justification for the exception, that being that the state,
when it enters the market, should be able to choose with whom it
does business.' The Supreme Court's desire to allow a state to act
in this manner would be minimized if the state could not direct the
proprietary actions of local government, given the tremendous
amount of proprietary activity local governments enter into that
effect a state's citizenry.
129. See id.
130. See Lincoln County, 153 U.S. at 530.
131. See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 439.
132. See id. (the Supreme Court stated that "the commerce clause was directed,
as an historical matter, only at regulatory and taxing actions taken by the states in
their sovereign capacity"). Thus, the reason the market participant exception acts
to allow the state to permissibly burden interstate commerce without running afoul
of the Dormant Commerce Clause is that the state, when participating in the
market, is acting in a quasi-private manner, rather than strictly in its sovereign
capacity. See id. ("When a State buys or sells, it has the attributes of both a
political entity and a private person.").
133. See Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179 (stating that local
government control fosters administrative efficiency).
134. See Reeves, Inc., 447 U.S. at 438 (stating that the market participant
exception allows the state to perform its role as trustee for its citizens free of
Dormant Commerce Clause restraints).
135. See id. at 438.
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VI. Conclusion
The analysis of whether the market participant exception to
the Dormant Commerce Clause should apply when state govern-
ment is directing the proprietary action of local government hinges
on whether the state is seen as a market regulator or as a market
participant. The approach taken by the Third, Fourth, Eight and
Ninth Circuits characterizes the local government entity as merely a
subdivision of the state."' Thus when the state directs local
government, the state is in essence directing its own proprietary
activities and the market participant exception applies."' The
Seventh Circuit, however, has found that if the local entity itself is
engaging in proprietary activities without direct funding or
administration from the state, then the local entity is a market
participant independent from the state and the state is acting in a
regulatory fashion.13
The favorable approach, in light of Supreme Court precedent,
is that taken by the Third, Fourth, Eighth and Ninth Circuits. The
U.S. Supreme Court has stated that local government entities are
merely extensions of the state, a characterization that is also
present under state law. Therefore, if local government exists at
the will of the state, deriving authority from the state, then the state
can constitutionally direct the purchasing choices of its local
branches under the market participant exception.
The approach taken by the Seventh Circuit ignores that local
governments are dependent on the state, for their proprietary
authority and requires that courts make a case by case analysis into
the autonomy of local government. Such an approach fails to
consider two fundamental reasons for the creation of the market
participant exception. The first being ease of application in dealing
with state proprietary activity, and the second being the right of the
state to act for the benefit of its citizens in selecting whom it
chooses to do business with, be it at the state or local level.
Jason Baranski
136. See National Solid Waste Mgmt. Ass'n., 146 F.3d at 597; Smith Setzer &
Sons, Inc., 20 F.3d at 1319-20; Big Country Foods, Inc., 952 F.2d at 1179; Trojan
Tech., Inc., 916 F.2d at 911.
137. See id.
138. See W.C.M. Window Co., Inc.. 730 F.2d at 494.
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